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ABSTRACT
In English law, the legal term for father has been given a broad deﬁnition but the deﬁni-
tion of mother remains rooted in biology with the Roman law principle mater semper certa
est (the mother is always certain) remaining the norm. However, motherhood may be
acquired through giving birth to a child, by donation of gametes or by caring and nurtur-
ing a child so that the identity of the mother is no longer certain particularly in the case of
surrogacy arrangements. While the law in the UK may automatically recognise the paren-
tal status of a commissioning father in a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the parental
status of the commissioning mother is not automatically recognised in either a traditional
or a gestational surrogacy arrangement. Thus the maxim mater est quam gestation demon-
strat (meaning the mother is demonstrated by gestation) is also not approached consis-
tently in the legal interpretation of parentage or motherhood in surrogacy as against other
assisted reproduction methods. This raises questions about the extent to which mother-
hood should be affected by the method of reproduction and whether the sociological and
philosophical concept of motherhood should, in the case of surrogacy, give rise to a new
principle of ‘mater semper incertus est’ (the mother is uncertain). This article will argue that
the time has come to move away from a legal deﬁnition of ‘mother’ that is based on
biology to one that recognises the different forms of motherhood.
KEYWORDS: Surrogacy, Epigenetics, Commissioning couples, Motherhood, Early
parental orders, Legal and social parent
I . INTRODUCTION
Surrogacy has historical roots1 and has been prevalent in popular culture
through ﬁlm2 and literature,3 but still retains a social stigma in modern
© The Author [2014]. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.
permissions@oup.com
1 See the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi dating back to around 1772 BC, which regulated and controlled
the practice of surrogacy and where the surrogate mother was expected to relinquish all parental rights. See
also the Lipit—Ishtar Code of Mesopotamia that is thought to pre-date the Hammurabi Code by two cen-
turies, which permitted a man whose wife had not borne him a child to use the services of a ‘Harlot’ for
conception. See also reference in the Book of Genesis 16.1–16.16 of the surrogate birth of Ishmael who
was carried by the maid Hagar for Abraham and his wife Sarai.
2 See ﬁlms such as The Surrogacy Trap (Adrian Wills, 2013) and Baby Mama (Michael McCullers, 2008).
3 See ﬁctional novels such as M Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (ﬁrst published 1985, Vintage Books, London
1996); J Weiner, Then Came You (Washington Square Press, London 2011); R Bailey, What Happens in
Charleston (Harlequin, Toronto 2012); M Ferns, Deadly Deals (Zebra Books, Cambridge 2010).
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society.4 For those couples embarking on surrogacy, the journey is fraught with legal
conundrums particularly in the area of parental rights. The legal position adopted in
the UK is that the birth mother is the legal mother. In this article, I argue that this law
is out dated and that there is room for the surrogate and commissioning parents to
record their intention as to legal motherhood in writing. This should be used as a
basis for granting early parental orders prior to the birth of the child similar to Califor-
nian pre-birth judgments. In section II, an argument is advanced that the law has not
kept pace with societal attitudes to motherhood while being prepared to recognise the
different forms of fatherhood and to update the deﬁnition accordingly. I consider the
arguments for recognition of both the biological and non-biological commissioning
mother’s status using the epigenetics arguments aired in the recent Irish High Court
decision of M.R & Anor v An tArd Chlaraitheoir and Others [2013]. I also consider
Baroness Hale’s categorisation of ‘natural parent’ from the case of Re G (Children)
[2006]. In section III, the legal parenthood provisions of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’) are discussed and Honneth’s theory of recog-
nition used as a vehicle to argue that the term ‘mother’ is important to a woman’s
sense of identity.
Section IV deals with the question of whether the current legal deﬁnition of
mother should be displaced in surrogacy and I consider the situation in other jurisdic-
tions. Section V discusses the practical effect of moving from a position of certainty to
one of uncertainty in respect of the legal deﬁnition of mother. In section VI, consider-
ation is given to how the welfare of the child principle might be addressed in any shift
in the law of motherhood in the context of a surrogacy arrangement. In section VII,
the law in California is considered and I argue that this might offer a model for future
reform. I conclude that surrogacy requires a shift in the presumption of motherhood
from a presumption based on maternity (giving birth) to one based on the ultimate
care and nurture role (motherhood).5 This article is concerned with the rights of the
commissioning mother in a surrogacy arrangement rather than the rights of egg
donors generally.6
I I . FATHERHOOD VERSUS MOTHERHOOD
The law in England and Wales gives a generous deﬁnition of father that is not based
solely on biology. For example, under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
2008 (‘the 2008 Act’), the husband of a woman who acts as a surrogate will be treated
as the father of the child even where he has not provided his sperm and therefore has
4 A study by AE Poote and OBA Van Akker, ‘British Women’s Attitudes to Surrogacy’ [2009] 24(1) Hum
Rep 139 found that British women had a largely negative attitude to surrogacy. Surrogacy arrangements are
also illegal in European countries such as Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy.
5 This conceptual distinction was ﬁrst made by Katherine O’Donovan and Jill Marshall, see K O’Donovan
and J Marshall, ‘After Birth: Decisions About Becoming a Mother’ in A Diduck and K O’Donovan (eds)
Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge–Cavendish, Oxford 2006) and J Marshall, ‘Giving Birth but
Refusing Motherhood: Inauthentic Choice or Self-Determining Identity?’ [2008] Int JLC 169 and origi-
nally proposed by Sara Ruddick in her seminal work, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (The
Women’s Press Ltd, London 1990).
6 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acy 2008 s 47 states that a woman who is an egg donor is not to be
treated as the mother of the child simply by virtue of that donation.
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no biological connection to the child.7 In addition, a man who consents to being
treated as the father during assisted reproduction treatment of a woman will also be
regarded as the father where the woman consents to this.8 Fatherhood is also acquired
via marriage9 with the husband then entitled to be registered as the father on the
child’s birth certiﬁcate.10 In addition, any man registered on the birth certiﬁcate of a
child automatically acquires parental responsibility.11 A father’s legal status is therefore
not dependent on biology hence the principle, mater semper incertus est (‘the father is
uncertain’).
However, the legal deﬁnition of mother remains one based on biology and depen-
dent on a woman carrying a child to birth (maternity).12
Section 33 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 deﬁnes
mother as:
The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in
her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as
the mother of the child.13
It can therefore be regarded as an irrebuttable presumption. This therefore
excludes women who have donated their ovum (and therefore have a biological con-
nection to the child) but have not carried the child and also women who are not bio-
logically connected to the child but are responsible for nurturing, caring, and raising
the child.
In legislation, the terms ‘parent’, ‘mother’, and ‘father’ are often used interchange-
ably and are not clearly deﬁned, examples include the Children Act 1989 which uses
the terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’ without deﬁnition and gives only a limited deﬁnition
of ‘parent’.14 The Registration of Births Deaths and Marriages Act 195315 also does
not deﬁne any of the three terms. Even when one looks to the adoption legislation
and Conventions, there are no clear deﬁnitions. For example, the European Conven-
tion on the Adoption of Children 1968 states that the term ‘father’ and ‘mother’ mean
‘the persons who are according to law the parents of the child’ but does not go on to
give a broad deﬁnition.16 Both the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the Hague
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
7 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 35.
8 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 37.
9 The common law presumption of legitimacy.
10 See the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1953 s 1(2)(a).
11 Adoption and Children Act 2002 s 111.
12 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 33.
13 Ibid.
14 See s 2, which refers to mother and father but does not deﬁne those terms. S 4ZA attempts to deﬁne
parent but only in the context of s 42 and s 43 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and
schedule 1 paragraph 16 deﬁnes parent but only in the context of a claim for ﬁnancial relief but not in the
context of other parts of the 1989 Act.
15 See Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1953 s 1(2)(a), s 2(a), and s 10.
16 European Convention on the Adoption of Children 1968 Art 5 (5) as ratiﬁed by the UK on 21 December
1968 and came into force on 26 April 1968.
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of Inter-country Adoption17 use the terms ‘parent’ and ‘mother’ and ‘father’ without
deﬁnition.
If therefore the mother and father are regarded as the ‘parent’, one would at least
expect a clear deﬁnition of parentage within our laws. There are many deﬁnitions of legal
parentage, which can include those acquiring parentage through parental responsibility,18
adoption,19 and parental orders.20 Legal parentage is a status that can be acquired by the
operation of the law, but various statutory provisions give different meanings to the term
‘parent’. For example, for the purposes of a ﬁnancial relief application, the Children Act
1989 deﬁnes ‘parent’ as including any party to a marriage or civil partnership where the
child concerned is the child of the family.21 However, the Education Act 1996 deﬁnes
‘parent’ more broadly as including any person who is not a parent of a child but has
parental responsibility or care for the child.22 Under the 2008 Act, the same sex partner
of a woman who receives assisted reproduction treatment will be regarded as the parent
of a child23 when compared with the Immigration Rules 1994 where the deﬁnition
includes natural parents, step-parents, and those with parental responsibility.24
In the case of Re C (Minors) (Adoption: Residence Order) [1993],25 Butler-Sloss LJ
stated that the term parent was not ﬁxed and changes depending on the context in
which it is used and that the natural and ordinary meaning of parent did not always
include the natural parents (the mother and father). This case involved the question
of the legal status of the applicant who was the father of a child that was freed for
adoption. The court had to consider whether the applicant could still be regarded as a
‘parent’ within the meaning of section 8 of the Children Act 1989. Butler-Sloss LJ
illustrated how the term could be given different meanings in society:
The term ‘parent’ must be given its natural and ordinary meaning. It does not
follow, however, that that meaning will always include the natural parents. The
natural and ordinary meaning of a word is not ﬁxed but changes according to the
context in which a word is used. Thus the meaning of ‘parent’ in a school prospectus
will include a person with de facto parental responsibility even if not a natural
parent, but exclude a natural parent who has no contact with the child. On the other
hand, the meaning of ‘parent’ in a work on genetics will be the biological parents,
including a father who has no more connection than the initial act of fertilisation.26
17 The Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Inter-
country Adoption Art 26 (1) refers to the recognition of the legal parent–child relationship between the
children and the adopted parents and the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or
her mother or father but does not deﬁne the terms ‘parent’, ‘mother’, or ‘father’.
18 Children Act 1989 s 3.
19 Adoption and Children Act 2002 s 46 and s 47.
20 Family Proceedings Rules [2010] Part 13 and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54.
21 Children Act 1989 schedule 1 para 16.
22 Education Act 1996 s 576.
23 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 42 and s 43.
24 Immigration Rules 1994 (as amended) para 6.
25 Re C (Minors) (Adoption: Residence Order) also known as M v C and Calderdale Metropolitan Borough
Council [1993] 1 FLR 505.
26 Re C (Minors) (Adoption: Residence Order) also known as M v C and Calderdale Metropolitan Borough
Council [1993] 1 FLR 505 page 509.
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Case law in England and Wales has recognised that parentage can be acquired
both naturally and legally. In the case T v B [2010],27 a ‘legal parent’ has been
described as either a biological parent or one recognised by operation of the law.28
‘Natural parent’ was described by Baroness Hale in Re G (Children) [2006]29 as a
status that could be acquired in three ways (1) by ‘genetic parenthood’ involving the
provision of gametes, (2) by ‘gestational parenthood’ involving the conception of a
child, and (3) by ‘social and psychological parenthood’ involving the care and nurture
of a child. The use of the term ‘natural’ in this context is interesting because when
applied to motherhood or fatherhood it is normally taken to denote a biological con-
ception to the child and not Baroness Hale’s third category of ‘social and psychologi-
cal parent’. In Baroness Hale’s deﬁnition, the natural parent encompasses both the
social and biological parent.
A biological parent is included in the deﬁnition of a legal parent as seen by the pro-
visions of the 2008 Act, yet in the case of surrogacy a commissioning mother with a
biological connection to the child is not a legal parent and so must instead apply to
the court for a parental order to recognise her status. Using Baroness Hale’s terminol-
ogy, it might therefore be more appropriate to term such commissioning mothers as
‘bio-natural’ mothers/parents.
It is the third category of natural parent (the ‘social and psychological parent’) that
is the more problematic in legal terms. This is because while society would recognise
such a parent (as in Butler-Sloss LJ’s example of a school prospectus) the ‘social and
psychological parent’ is not always recognised as the legal parent. This third category
of the ‘natural parent’ one could argue may therefore be thought of as a category of
‘socio-natural mother/parent’ to distinguish its lack of automatic legal recognition. A
parent can regard himself or herself as a ‘socio-natural’ parent without intervention of
the court but will require court intervention to be regarded as a legal parent. It is the
legal parentage status that confers rights to make decisions affecting the child in the
face of a dispute and to be recognised by society as having those rights to take action
on behalf of the child.
In UK law, a parent is not based on biology, the status of father is no longer based
on biology but the status of the mother remains rooted in biology. The legal deﬁni-
tion of the mother becomes particularly problematic in the area of surrogacy when
there may be two women with a biological connection to the child and therefore two
potential mothers.
Surrogacy has been deﬁned as a prior arrangement made by one woman to carry a
child for another woman (the commissioning mother) with a view to handing over
the child on birth as well as relinquishing parental responsibility for the child.30 The
surrogate may provide her own eggs (traditional surrogacy) or act as a host womb
into which an embryo is implanted (gestational surrogacy). In a gestational surrogacy
situation, the eggs may be provided by the commissioning mother or by a separate
egg donor. In the UK, a legal framework for surrogacy was ﬁrst given consideration in
27 T v B [2010] EWHC 1444.
28 See T v B [2010] EWHC 1444 para 22.
29 Re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43 para 33.
30 See Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985 s 1(2) and s 1(3).
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198431 and reviewed again in 199832 and 2005.33 However, despite extensive exami-
nation of this area of law, no proposals emerged for the legal deﬁnition of parentage
to be reconsidered in the context of surrogacy. The Hague Conference on Private
International law recognised in 2012 the need to provide a uniform approach to legal
parentage in private international law34 but equally that this might prove difﬁcult to
achieve given the different views taken by States as to rights on maternity.35
As far back as 1984 The Warnock Committee36 were tasked with considering the
legal, social, and ethical implications of the developments in human fertilisation
including surrogacy. In paragraphs 6.8 and 7.6 of the Warnock report, the committee
considered the position with regard to dual motherhood in surrogacy and felt that in
the case of the use of egg donors (where the eggs are provided by someone other
than the commissioning mother or the surrogate) they should be treated in the same
way as sperm donors and have no rights over the resulting child. They recommended
that the legal mother should remain the person carrying the child, thereby supporting
the mother is certain principle. At paragraph 8.20, they brieﬂy considered but dis-
missed the possibility of two mothers having a genetic connection to the child by the
commissioning mother providing her ovum. This rejection was on the basis that the
committee had recommended in 18.18 of their report that commercial surrogacy
should be illegal and therefore they felt it unlikely that a situation would arise where
the commissioning mother would provide her eggs because it would be illegal for cli-
nicians to be involved in the treatment.37 The report recommended at 18.19 that
private arrangements should remain legal; however, the committee did not consider
the implications for the ‘socio-natural’ mother in a traditional or gestational surrogacy
arrangement (where a separate egg donor is used) and there was no attempt to dis-
place the mater semper certa est principle. This was, in my view, a missed opportunity
for the committee to consider the full future implications of dual claims to mother-
hood. However, one must also bear in mind that this was the ﬁrst attempt to consider
prospective legislation in this complex area and at the time of the Warnock commit-
tee’s report surrogacy was yet to emerge as a new form of fertility treatment available
in licensed clinics. In fact by 1996, attitudes to surrogacy had changed with the British
Medical Association (BMA) supporting treatment in licensed clinics.38 The Brazier
31 Department of Health and Social Security Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology (‘the Warnock Committee’) (White Paper, Cm 9314, 1984).
32 Department of Health’s Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regula-
tion (‘the Brazier Report’) (White Paper Cm 4068, 1998).
33 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, ‘Human Reproductive Technology and the Law’, 24
March 2005, HC 7-1, 164.
34 Hague Conference on Private International Law, A preliminary Report on the Issues Arising form Interna-
tional Surrogacy Arrangements document no.10 March 2012 at para 53.
35 ibid at para 55. See also Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013).
36 Above n 31.
37 The British Medical Association did not ofﬁcially approve surrogacy as a form of treatment in licensed
clinics until 1996 see British Medical Association, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood (BMA publications,
London 1996).
38 See British Medical Association, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood (BMA publications, London 1996).
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Committee39 in 1998 were tasked primarily with considering the issue of ‘reasonable
expenses’ as well as whether surrogacy arrangements should be regulated. They were
not tasked with considering the issues of parentage within surrogacy.
It was not until the 2008 Act that radical changes were made to legal parentage in
assisted reproduction. The changes are contained in Part 2 of the 2008 Act and led to
a heated debate in both Houses of Parliament during the debate of the Bill itself. Part
2 of the 2008 Act recognises legal parentage in the case of single and same sex
couples as well as heterosexual couples and controversially replaced the previous
requirement by clinics to consider the ‘need for a father’ when deciding on treatment
with the need for ‘supportive parents’. Baroness O’Cathain debating the Bill argued
for the deletion of Part 2 saying:
Part 2 has the effect of redeﬁning what it means to be a mother or a father. It is
intended to create a separate category of parent for those who do not ﬁt the
description of either mother or father, thereby creating in law a family that
could never exist in nature.40
There is no doubt that the provisions of Part 2 are far reaching and are not only
complex but appear contradictory in places. For example, automatic legal parentage
can be acquired by deceased partners who can acquire automatic parentage status as
long as the assisted reproduction treatment (other than surrogacy) was started before
their death and consent forms were also in place. The deceased second parent may
have a biological connection under section 40 of the 2008 Act as the husband but
may not under section 46, which relates to female same sex couples.41 Under section
46 of the 2008 Act, legal parentage can be acquired automatically after death by the
second same sex female where her partner received treatment before her death and
the necessary consent forms were signed. Yet in some circumstances, a second same
sex female who remains alive will not acquire legal parentage status without the inter-
vention of the court. This is true in the case of same sex female couples who are not in
a civil partnership and use a private sperm donor without the assistance of a licensed
clinic as well as same sex female couples who conceived before 6 April 2009.42
In practical terms, it is arguable that the 2008 Act also provides a route to possible
dual motherhood for female same sex couples in assisted reproduction (other than
surrogacy) but bars dual motherhood in the case of surrogacy. McCandless and
Sheldon43 argue that section 42 is an example of an attempt to reserve a status for
the second female that is close to the means by which men obtain fatherhood.44
Therefore, the method of reproduction can in the case of female same sex couples
39 Department of Health’s Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regula-
tion (‘the Brazier Report’) (White Paper Cm 4068, 1998).
40 (HL) Hansard Deb 10 December 2007 vol 697 cols 24–25 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200708/ldhansrd/text/71210-0001.htm> accessed 7 August 2013.
41 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 40 and s 46.
42 This is the date when the new laws on the parentage status of same sex female couples conceiving through
a licensed clinic came into effect.
43 J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of
the Sexual Family’ [2010] 73 (2) MLR 175.
44 ibid page 193.
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determine whether or not they automatically acquire recognition as the mother. This
is because where a same sex female couple in a civil partnership use assisted reproduc-
tion that does not involve a surrogate then section 42 of the 2008 Act recognises the
second same sex female partner as the gender neutral parent as long as they are in a
civil partnership and the birth took place after 6 April 2009.45 If the couple are not in
a civil partnership then under section 43 the second female partner can still become
the second parent as long as both women consent to this before treatment in a
licensed clinic.46 One could argue that this is dual motherhood in all but name
although the law shies away from labelling it as such. These sections still require one
of the women to have carried the child but importantly the second female partner will
be regarded as the parent automatically and her status is not dependent on biology.
For female same sex couples (regardless of their civil partnership status) who
require the use of a surrogate to carry the embryo then section 33 of the 2008 Act still
applies and the surrogate is the legal mother. An application must then be made by
the commissioning couple for an adoption order or parental order (if one of the
mothers has a genetic connection to the child, this could be achieved by the use of
her own ovum). For those female same sex couples unable to use their own ova, then
the surrogate mother would be regarded as the legal mother but an application could
not be made for a parental order as section 54 of the 2008 Act requires that at least
one of the applicants has a genetic connection to the child.47 They would therefore
have to apply for an adoption order. The mothers would be what I have termed
‘socio-natural parents’. This would apply equally to a male same sex couple who use
both a sperm donor and a surrogate and therefore have no genetic connection to the
child. The 2008 Act was therefore a further missed opportunity to consider changes
to the legal deﬁnition of mother to include commissioning mothers to a surrogacy
arrangement within the deﬁnition of parentage. In addition, the question of whether
the law should recognise two mothers in a surrogacy arrangement was not fully dis-
cussed during the passage of the 2008 Act. McCandless and Sheldon48 conducted
semi-structured interviews with ofﬁcials from the Department of Health responsible
for overseeing the drafting of the 2008 Act. The interviews revealed that the Depart-
ment of Health initially considered the issue of two mothers in a surrogacy arrange-
ment in the early stages of the reform process but dismissed the idea as too
controversial and emotive and feared it would delay the passing of the Act.49
The perceived injustice of the mother is certain principle in a surrogacy arrange-
ment was highlighted in the Irish case of M.R & Anor v An tArd Chlaraitheoir and
Others [2013],50 which illustrates the complexities of genetics in determining
45 Although the law treats the second mother as the gender-neutral parent, the practical effect of s 42 and s
43 is that the child has two mothers.
46 See the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 43 and s 44 and the case of AB v CD [2013]
EWHC 1418 where failure to sign the consent forms before treatment began led to a declaration under s
55A of the Family Law Act 1986 that the second female parent was not the legal parent.
47 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54(1)(b).
48 J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of
the Sexual Family Form’ [2010] MLR 73(2) 175–207.
49 n 47, page 191.
50 M.R & Anor v An tArd Chlaraitheoir and Others [2013] IEHC 91.
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parenthood. This case involved a familial surrogacy arrangement with the sister of the
commissioning mother acting as the surrogate mother. The dispute the court was
asked to resolve was not around the surrogacy arrangement itself but on the issue of
the right of the commissioning couple to be registered as the parents on the child’s
birth certiﬁcate.
The High Court of Ireland heard from both an expert geneticist and a genetics lec-
turer on the issue of who could be considered the mother where one woman carries a
child but the other woman provides her ovum (eggs). The evidence of both experts
conﬁrmed that the DNA structure of the embryo would come from the mother pro-
viding her ovum but that the surrogate mother could still affect the foetal develop-
ment through a process known as epigenetics since the womb of the surrogate could
operate to turn some of the child’s genes on and off. The surrogate mother was also
able to affect the foetus’s immune system through the transfer of anti-bodes from the
surrogate mother to the foetus via the Placenta (‘michrochimerism’). However, more
importantly, it was accepted by the medical experts in this case that, ‘the person who
looks after the child after birth also has epigenetic effects on the child’.51 This is
because the epigenetic effects on the child during pregnancy could be reversed post-
natally due to experiences and environment that the child is exposed to. Epigenetics
theory centres on the development stages of an embryo up to adulthood and exam-
ines how non-genetic inﬂuences such as gravity, temperature, education, and social
environment affect development. Neglect and abuse in early childhood have been
linked to making children more susceptible to certain diseases and illnesses such as
heart disease and depression,52 and drug abuse.53 Evolutionary Development Psychol-
ogists such as Bjorklund54 argue that non-genetic maternal effects can be transmitted
from mother to offspring. Bjorklund uses ﬁndings from studies of chimpanzees (the
nearest mammal to humans in development) to support claims that the maternal
environment has an effect on a child’s phenotype (physical or biochemical character-
istics) causing molecular changes in the structure of DNA which in turn causes genes
to be activated or de-activated. Each foetus contains the full quantity of genes neces-
sary for development and the cytoplasmic environment of the mother’s ovum begins
the development stage, which is continued when the baby is born and exposed to its
physical and social environment. This in turn triggers further development. Thus the
importance of providing ovum (‘bio-natural mother’) as well as being a child’s carer
(the ‘socio-natural mother’) can be recognised when determining the issue of mother-
hood. Epigenetics therefore provides a powerful argument for the recognition of both
the biological and non-biological mother.
As the commissioning mother had a biological connection to the child in this case,
the High Court of Ireland, rejected the epigenetics arguments in favour of pure and
simple DNA testing as determining ‘the presence or absence of inheritable
51 ibid page 3, para 9.
52 See studies by SV Batten and others, ‘Childhood Maltreatment as a Risk Factor for Adult Cardiovascular
Disease and Depression’ [2004] 65 J Clin Psychiatry 249.
53 See studies by SR Dube and others, ‘Childhood Abuse, Neglect and Household Dysfunction and the Risk
of Illicit Drug Use: The Adverse Childhood Experiences Study’ [2003] 111 Pediatrics 564.
54 DF Bjorklund, ‘Mother Knows Best: Epigenetic Inheritance, Maternal Effects and the Evolution of Human
Intelligence’ [2006] 26 Dev Rev 213.
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characteristics’55 for the purposes of biology. The court accepted that the commis-
sioning mother had a biological connection to the child and could therefore be regis-
tered on the birth certiﬁcate. This avoided the need to make distinctions between
‘natural’ and ‘legal parent’ by simply applying DNA to the issue. The Irish State has
announced its intention to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court.56
Ireland, unlike England, has no clear laws governing surrogacy, although the
Commission for Assisted Reproduction in 2005 recommended, ‘the child born
through surrogacy should be presumed to be that of the commissioning couple’.57
On 22 February 2012, the Irish Government published for the ﬁrst time guidelines
on parentage and immigration. The surrogate is regarded as the legal mother (even if
another woman’s ovum is used) whether or not the child is born from her egg. This
disregards the recommendation of the Commission on legal motherhood.58 The
father will have to establish he is the genetic father of the child and apply to the courts
for a declaration of parentage as well as an application to be the guardian of the child.
Ireland has taken a cautious approach to regulating surrogacy in these guidelines,
whereas Mr Justice Abbott in the case of M.R v Anor case was prepared to take a much
more ambitious approach in the recognition of motherhood by accepting that mother-
hood could be acquired through genetics and biology and that this biological connection
should be recognised. The case of M.R. v Anor is also important because it explored the
possibility of a rebuttable presumption of motherhood with the use of blood tests. At
present in the UK, paternity can be established using DNA tests but motherhood
cannot be established in this way.59 In the UK, the biological and non-biological com-
missioning mother is not automatically recognised as either a mother or a parent.
I I I . WHAT ’S IN A NAME?
Ordinarily in family law, there are good reasons why the mater semper certa est princi-
ple should prevail. For example, if one considers the case of Marcyx v Belgium (1979)
2 EHRR 330 failure to apply this principle caused an injustice to the birth mother. In
this case, the applicant an unmarried mother challenged Article 319 of the Belgium
Civil Code that did not apply the mater semper certa est principle to unmarried
mothers and instead required them to either voluntarily recognise their own child or
start legal proceedings to adopt the child. Until such time, the child was not regarded
as part of the mother’s family. The European Court of Human Rights held that Bel-
gium’s different treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children violated both Articles
8 and 14 of the Convention because the differing treatment lacked ‘objective and rea-
sonable justiﬁcation’.
55 See Status of Children Act 1987 s 37.
56 Independent.ie reported on 26 July 2013 <www.independent.ie/irish-news> accessed 26th July 2013. The
appeal is listed for January 2014. However, the Family Relations and Children Bill 2013 currently being
debated in the Irish Parliament would, if passed, enable the courts to transfer parentage to a commission-
ing mother with a genetic connection to the child.
57 See Recommendation 33 Commission for Assisted Human Reproduction 2005 <www.dohc.ie/
publications/cahr.pdf?direct=1> accessed 18 July 2013.
58 But see the Family Relations and Children Bill 2013 which would enable the courts to transfer parentage
to a commissioning mother with a genetic connection to the child if passed.
59 Family Law Reform Act 1987 Part IV s 23.
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In other countries in Europe, the irrebutable presumption of motherhood remains
within gestational surrogacy and has not moved to a rebuttable presumption. For
example in Germany (where surrogacy practices are illegal), there is an equivalent
irrebuttable presumption of motherhood in their Civil Code, although the commis-
sioning mother can apply to adopt the child in certain circumstances.60 Similarly
Austria has an irrebuttable presumption of motherhood. In the case of S.H v Austria
(2000),61 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights overturned a
previous ruling in the Chamber that Article 8 (right to respect for private and family
life) and Article 14 (right not to be discriminated against) had been violated in the
case of two couples seeking in vitro treatment using donated sperm and ova. The
Grand Chamber held that there had been no violation as Austria was seeking to
protect its civil law principle that the identity of the mother is always certain and that
Austria should be allowed a margin of appreciation because of its need to reconcile
societal views and attitudes with the changing pace of medicine. The Grand Chamber
recognised that by allowing couples to use their own sperm or ova during in vitro fer-
tilisation Austria was taking a cautious but realistic step in reconciling medicine and
ethics.
So why should it matter if the UK adopts a position of certainty for motherhood
yet a position of uncertainty for fatherhood? Well the answer lies in both medical and
social science. If the theory of epigenetics is accepted, then a mother can inﬂuence
the development of a child by contributing DNA (through the ovum), by carrying
the child in the womb or by the maternal environment. In terms of social science, the
answer lies in the importance of identity and self-worth to the individual namely the
commissioning mother.
Some sociologists,62 philosophers,63 and professionals64 would argue that the
status of parent is not dependent on a biological connection to the child and that par-
entage based solely on the ability to love and nurture a child and to provide the
correct environment for the child’s development and growth are as equally important
as having a biological connection to the child. Goldstein, Solnit, Goldstein, and
Freud65 have argued that while a biological parent will have a psychological attach-
ment to a child based on a sense of accomplishment or self-worth, for the child the
attachment is based on day-to-day care. Therefore a parent who adopts the role of
carer can still form a psychological attachment to the child.
According to Brighouse and Swift,66 a non-biological parent who does not give
birth still has a role to play within the family. Their role involves the same acts of love,
commitment, and selﬂessness in raising a child as those demanded of a mother who
60 See Civil Code Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) 1571 Mutterschaft.
61 S.H. v Austria – 57813/00.
62 See for example H Lafollette’s controversial views that parenting should be licensed as an activity in H
Lafollette, ‘Licensing Parents’ [1980] 9 Phil & Pub Aff 182.
63 See for example H Brighouse and A Swift, ‘Parents’ Rights and the Value of Family’ [2006] 117 Ethics 80
and H Brighouse and A Swift, ‘Legitimate Parental Partiality’ [2009] 37 Phil & Pub Aff 43.
64 Goldstein, Solnit, Goldstein and Freud’s ‘psychological parent’ theory in J Goldstein and others, The Best
Interests of the Child (The Free Press, IL 1996).
65 Ibid.
66 H Brighouse and A Swift, ‘Parents’ Rights and the Value of Family’ [2006] 117 Ethics 80.
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gives birth to the child. Brighouse and Swift67 argue that in addition to the normal
ﬁduciary role, parents also have additional roles which make their position unique.
Firstly the dependency role, this is in respect of the child’s dependency on the parent
in that the child is subject to the decisions and choices of the parent. Secondly, the
exit role where parents have the power to exit the child–parent relationship at any
time in a way that a child does not. Thirdly, the intimacy role where the parent
receives unconditional love from a child and fourthly the moral role where the parent
is responsible for the well being and development of the child.68 These roles do not
depend on biology and together make up what Brighouse and Swift have termed ‘the
uniqueness of the parent’.
The law has grappled with whether legal parentage should take precedence over
natural parentage or whether the court should exercise a discretion as to which type
of parentage to recognise according to the circumstances of the case and the welfare
of the child. In cases such as Re M (Child Support Act: Parentage) [1997]69 and T v B
[2010],70 the court speciﬁcally rejected the recognition of the natural parent in favour
of the legal parent deﬁnition. In the case of Re M [1997], the court rejected argu-
ments by the Child Support Agency that a father could become a legal father by estop-
pel simply by virtue of consenting to assisted reproduction.71 In the case of T v B
[2010] involving an application for ﬁnancial relief for a child following the breakdown
of a female same sex relationship, Mr Justice Moylan accepted that the respondent
was a natural parent but decided that the provisions under schedule 1 paragraph 16 of
the Children Act 1989 could only apply to a legal parent (biological parents and
those who are parents by operation of the law). This could not in his view be a ‘discre-
tionary welfare decision’ but had to be a status based on law.
While a discretionary approach may not be a suitable approach, surrogacy is a
unique situation that requires a unique approach to motherhood and parentage
because a child will have more than one mother. While a commissioning mother can
apply for a parental order, she must wait until after the birth of the child and then a
further six weeks to enable the surrogate mother a ‘cooling-off’ period to withdraw
her consent to transfer of parentage. She must then formally apply for a parental
order within six months of the birth of the child72 and this is done jointly with her
husband/partner.73 This process can itself take months because of the need for the
commissioning parents to be assessed by a Parental Court Reporter from the Children
and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass). Cafcass has an important
role to play in ensuring that the commissioning couple are able to provide a stable
home environment for the child in the same way that assessment by social services of
the adoptive parents is necessary in adoption proceedings. Within the period between
the birth of the child and the grant of a Parental order, the surrogate is responsible for
registering the child’s birth and consenting to any medical treatment. Recent research
67 Ibid.
68 H Brighouse and A Swift, ‘Parents’ Rights and the Value of Family’ [2006] 117 Ethics 92.
69 Re M (Child Support Act: Parentage) (1997) 2 FLR 90.
70 T v B [2010] EWHC 1444.
71 In this case, the assisted reproduction took place before the Human Fertilisation Acts 1990 and 2008.
72 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54(3).
73 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act s 54(2).
12 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 at University of Hertfordshire on January 24, 2014
http://medlaw.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
by the Centre for Family Research, University of Cambridge74 revealed some discon-
tent by surrogates at having to register their names on the birth certiﬁcate initially as
well as the period of time taken for the grant of a Parental order. This could be
avoided if the courts were able to recognise the legal parentage or motherhood status
of the commissioning mother prior to the birth of the child.
Recognition as a parent is important not only for the social status of the parent but
also for the identity of the child. There are practical legal issues to navigate in raising a
child which depend on recognition of parentage such as admission into the UK for
the child based on the parent’s nationality, the right to approve medical procedures
for the child, enrolment of the child into school, the right to bring and defend legal
proceedings on behalf of the child, and succession rights of the child to the parent’s
estate on intestacy. A commissioning mother is unable to acquire those rights until
the courts have made a parental order after the birth of a child.
Social acceptance as a mother one could argue is important from a practical point
of view for the ‘socio-natural parent’s identity’ as much as that of the ‘bio-natural
parent’. However, it is also important for the child’s own identity to have the status of
the child’s parent recognised socially and legally. The question of the importance of
the child–mother relationship to the identity of the child has been legally recognised
for sometime. More recently in the case of A, A v P, P, B [2011], Mrs Justice Theis
DBE recognised that the concept of identity included the need for the relationship
between parent and child to be recognised.75 Article 8 of the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child also provides that States will:
Undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations as recognised by law without
unlawful interference.76
Those ‘family relations’ should arguably include the relationship not only between
a child and a biological parent but also between a child and the socio-natural parent.
In the UK, there is of course the child’s right to make an application for declaration of
parentage under the Family Law Act 198677 but this, like parental orders must
happen post-birth. While the Convention makes special provisions for refugee, dis-
abled and adopted children there is no reference to children born through assisted
reproduction who might face disputes as to parentage. The failure of the Convention
to address assisted reproduction, in particular in the area of surrogacy and the long-
term effects, this may have on a child in terms of the right to know their birth mother
perhaps reﬂects how quickly medicine has advanced since the Convention was ratiﬁed
in 1989.78 Indeed the issue of the law not keeping pace with advances in science was
also highlighted recently in the English case of CD v ST79 which was referred to the
74 S Imrie and V Jadva, ‘Surrogacy Law: A Call for Change?’ Bionews 716 (5 August 2013).
75 A, A v P, P, B [2011] EWHC 1738 para 28.
76 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 Art 8.
77 Family Law Act 1986 s 55A.
78 The British Medical Council only accepted that surrogacy should be permitted practice in licensed clinics
in 1996, see above n 37.
79 CD v ST Case C-167/12.
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Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation
of EU Directives. Advocate General Kokott noted that the EU Legislature had only
taken biological motherhood into account when drafting the Pregnant Workers Direc-
tive80 and had not considered surrogacy as a practice. Advocate General Kokott ruled
that, as the objective of protection of maternity leave was to ensure that the develop-
ment of the mother–child relationship was not hindered that this should extend to
the protection of the relationship between the commissioning mother and the child.
She ruled that entitlement to maternity leave should extend to the commissioning
mother who should share such leave with the surrogate mother. The commissioning
mother in this case was a non-biological mother.
As far as the identity of the mother is concerned, recognition theorists have
accepted the importance and impact of recognition on an individual’s quality of life
for many years.81 It is argued that the label of ‘mother’ is important to a woman’s
sense of identity and therefore the legal deﬁnition of mother should not be based on
a biological deﬁnition but should recognise the social meaning of motherhood.
Honneth82 draws on Hegel’s struggle for recognition theory,83 which argues that
laws are recognised through a step-by-step process that involves a struggle for recogni-
tion. Honneth argues that recognition is essential to self-realisation and self-worth
and that there are three forms of interaction connected to recognition and these are
through ﬁrstly, the need for physical and emotional love from our relationships with
family and ‘signiﬁcant others’. Secondly our demand for rights (particularly equal
rights) as a measure of our worth against others and thirdly the recognition of
our own personality traits and personal difference necessary for our self-esteem.
The latter is what might be regarded as the recognition of our own uniqueness as a
person (our ‘solidarity’). Honneth considers the struggle of recognition in the context
of a child’s struggle84 to free themselves from their mother’s control to assert their
independence.
If one were to consider Honneth’s theory in the context of legal recognition of the
commissioning mother, one might surmise that the commissioning mother requires
physical and emotional love from her child who must recognise her as the mother.
The demand for equal rights comes in the form of applications to the court for recog-
nition of parental status, British citizenship application for the child, registration of
80 Council Directive 92/85/EEC.
81 See for example Hegel and Mead’s theories of legal recognition both of which rely on the premise that
legal recognition is reciprocal and requires individual’s to understand what is expected of them by others as
a member of a social collective. See for example, GH Mead, ‘Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political
Institution’ [1915] 12 J Phil Psych Sci Methods 141; GWG Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit (AV Miller
tr, ﬁrst published 1807, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1977) and C Taylor, in A Gutmann (ed) The politics of
Recognition. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, (Princeton University Press, Princeton
1994). See also A Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conﬂicts (Polity
Press, Cambridge 1995).
82 A Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conﬂicts (Polity Press, Cambridge
1995). Axel Honneth draws on Mead and Hegel’s theories of recognition.
83 GWG Hegel Phenomenology of the Spirit (AV Miller tr, ﬁrst published 1807, Clarendon Press,
Oxford1977).
84 Honneth draws on Hegel’s ‘affectional relationship’ theory between parent and child and Winnicotts ‘rela-
tive dependence’ theory of the relationship between mother and child.
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parentage on the child’s birth certiﬁcate, and even more political struggles for recogni-
tion of the same rights and beneﬁts accorded to surrogate mother such as maternity
pay and leave.85 It is the third stage, the uniqueness of the person that is arguably the
more complex and often criticised86 aspect of the three stages because as well as the
mother relying on her own internal recognition it also requires some shared external
recognition (‘intersubjectivity’) of her motherhood. This shared external recognition
is based on the mother’s place in society, which allows her to express her own unique-
ness. Society recognises the legal parent rather than the natural parent (for example,
hospitals and schools would act on the instructions of a birth mother rather than a
commissioning mother who does not have a court order) and while the commission-
ing mother may recognise her own motherhood status often societal recognition is
needed for her to fully make decisions and take actions relating to the child.
IV. DISPLACEMENT OF THE LEGAL PARENT
A woman with a biological connection to the child who does not give birth is at the
same disadvantage as a woman with no biological connection to the child in that the
law does not recognise her immediate entitlement to be a mother. A commissioning
father who has a biological connection to the child can, however, be placed in a better
position in terms of automatic recognition of his legal fatherhood status (if the surro-
gate is unmarried). One could therefore argue that in surrogacy law, sperm donation
is given greater signiﬁcance than egg donation in denoting parentage because a com-
missioning father who donates his sperm to an unmarried surrogate can acquire auto-
matic recognition of his legal fatherhood status. This then raises the issue of potential
discrimination between the sexes in terms of denoting legal parentage.
However, one has to also consider that commissioning fathers who donate sperm
to a married surrogate cannot automatically displace the recognition of the surrogate’s
husband as the legal father, a parental order is needed to do this. This is therefore in
line with the requirement that a commissioning mother must also apply to the court
to displace the legal recognition of the surrogate’s motherhood status. One could
therefore argue that the law operates in a consistent way to prevent the displacement
of a legal parent by a natural parent without court intervention. If this argument were
followed, then there would appear to be no perceived sex discrimination in the way
the surrogacy laws treat legal parentage between commissioning fathers and mothers.
If this same argument is applied in relation to the operation of section 42 and
section 43 of the 2008 Act which recognises gender neutral parentage in the case of
85 See the case of C-D and S-T [2011] ET- 2505033/11 which was referred to the Court of Justice of the
European Union. The court ruled that maternity leave should be shared between both the commissioning
mother and the surrogate mother with a minimum of two weeks leave each. The change in government
policy to allow commissioning mothers to be entitled to adoption pay and leave from 2015 is set out in the
Children and Families Bill 032 2013-14 s 94 currently going through the House of Lords and the govern-
ment’s commitment to changing the law was ﬁrst set out in HM Government’s consultation on the
modern workplaces: Modern Workplaces Government Response on Flexible Parental Leave, page 7 see
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/employment-matters/docs/m/12-1267-modern-workplaces-response-
ﬂexible-parental-leave.pdf> accessed 20 July 2013.
86 See for example Nancy Fraser’s criticisms of Honneth’s stages of recognition in N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Rec-
ognition’ [2000] 3 New Left Rev 107.
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female same sex couples (where one of them receives assisted reproduction treat-
ment), then again there is no displacement of the legal parent (male or female).
Instead two parents are achieved. This then raises the question of whether the two
parent model should be the norm and whether a model can be put in place for surro-
gacy that recognises dual parenthood in relation to the rights of both the commission-
ing mother and the surrogate. Wallbank87 advocates a position whereby child sharing
by two mothers should become the legal and societal norm in surrogacy arrangements
when the court is considering legal disputes in surrogacy, adoption, and donor insem-
ination so that it is not approached as a choice between two mothers. Wallbank sug-
gests this would best serve the welfare principle of the child.88 Jackson89 similarly
argues that there is no reason why we cannot depart from the two parent model par-
ticularly in assisted reproduction situations and that it is wrong for the law to maintain
a position of ‘parental exclusivity’ particularly as the granting of parental responsibility
to others who are not biologically connected to the child is an example of where the
importance of social parenting is recognised. However, Jackson also accepts that even
if we were to move to a model where more than two parents were recognised, the law
would still need to recognise the ‘principal parents’ for the purposes of residence and
child support. The difﬁculty with arguments of child sharing by two mothers or more
than two parents is that in the case of surrogacy, like adoption, there will be a propor-
tion of parents who do not wish to maintain contact with the birth mother. Also in
the case of inter-country surrogacy, there would be practical difﬁculties with child
sharing where the birth mother resides in another country. Child sharing by two
mothers is workable in the context of a same sex female couple (who have used a
sperm donor) simply because they are living in the same household, there is an inten-
tion to share child rearing. However, as can be seen by cases such as Re G (Children)
[2006]90 and T v B [2010]91 disputes about same sex parentage are still reaching the
courts. However, it is also accepted that there may be circumstances where the com-
missioning parents want to maintain contact with the surrogate mother particularly if
she has a biological connection to the child and she has children who will be related
to the child and for this reason the courts should not adopt a one mother rule.
However, whether the parties in this situation would want to move to a child sharing
model or merely a position whereby they remain in contact with letters and photo-
graphs being passed to the child must remain, in my view, a matter for the parties
themselves. The mechanism already exists to bring any disputes before the courts.
However, in terms of a legal deﬁnition of motherhood, I agree that in moving to a
rebuttable presumption, there is scope to widen the section 3392 deﬁnition in the case
of surrogacy to include (a) the birth mother and (b) the intended mother in a
87 J Wallbank, ‘Too Many Mothers? Surrogacy, Kinship and the Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 Med L Rev
271.
88 The welfare of the child principle now applies to applications for a parental order as a result of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental orders) Regulations 2010 s 2.
89 J Jackson, ‘What Is a Parent’ in A Diduck and K O’Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law
(Routledge–Cavendish, Oxford 2006).
90 Above n 29.
91 Above n 27.
92 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 33.
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surrogacy arrangement (both biological and non-biological). The decision as to who
becomes the principal parent is then determined in the grant of an early parental
order in the commissioning mother’s favour, which operates to terminate the mother-
hood status of the surrogate mother. However, the section 54 parental order proce-
dure should also be used for applications by the surrogate mother for the grant of
contact rights or parental responsibility depending on the wishes of the parties as evi-
denced in a Memorandum of Understanding (this is discussed in section VII).
Legal recognition of motherhood in surrogacy should be based on Baroness Hale’s
term ‘natural parent’ it is argued because it would achieve fairness in a situation where
the parties have agreed that the commissioning mother should be the ultimate
mother. This utilitarian approach would maximise fairness to the commissioning
mother while still protecting the rights of the birth mother. Where the parties have
agreed that the commissioning mother should be the ultimate mother, this should be
reﬂected in the legal parentage status acquired by raising a rebuttable presumption in
favour of the commissioning mother. Horsey93 explores the concept of intention in
surrogacy agreements and argues that intention should be used as a pre-birth stage
determinant of parentage in surrogacy cases. She argues for a presumption in favour
of the commissioning mother as the legal parent without the need for court interven-
tion on the basis that notional intention is capable of amounting to an enforceable
promise and that it should be for the surrogate mother to make any challenges as to
parenthood. However, as I will later argue, court intervention and parental orders
remain necessary because the birth mother’s rights should not be overlooked because
of the psychological ties that can be formed with the child during birth. In addition
issues of autonomy that may arise, for example in decisions to abort the foetus, will
require court determination. The court also has a role to play in ensuring that the
intention has been freely given as well as ensuring that the surrogacy arrangement has
not contravened the provisions of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.
Intention is, however, a good basis for arguing the presumption of motherhood
should be reversed so that it is drawn in favour of the commissioning mother.
However, this reversed presumption should remain rebuttable. While the intention of
the parties should be given due consideration, the court needs to consider other
factors such as the welfare of the child and therefore the courts should continue to
oversee such arrangements I do not argue that intention should be a basis for creating
contractual obligations, merely as evidence when the court is considering applications
for an early parental order. The intention of parties is evidenced by their consent to
enter into a surrogacy arrangement and one could argue this is analogous to the
consent provisions required under sections 40, 42, 43, and 46 of the 2008 Act in rela-
tion to other assisted reproduction treatments. The only difference is that surrogacy
will not always arise as a result of treatment in a licensed clinic.
The motherhood status of the commissioning mother could be protected by one
of two solutions, ﬁrstly an amendment to section 33 of the 2008 Act to include a com-
missioning mother within the legal deﬁnition of mother. It should then be possible
for the commissioning mother to make an application for a parental order prior to
93 K Horsey, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ [2010] 22(4)
CFLQ.
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birth with a mechanism for this to be contested in the courts by the surrogate mother.
This approach does not disadvantage the surrogate mother because at present, even
though she is recognised as the legal mother, should she wish to keep the child follow-
ing birth this dispute would still need to be determined by the court.94 This I have
argued would provide the optimum fairness to the commissioning mother in situa-
tions where she was always intended to be the legal mother. The second alternative
would be for the present legal deﬁnition to remain the same but simply for section 54
of the 2008 Act to be amended to allow for early parental orders. This would at least
ensure that any delays in the commissioning mother acquiring legal recognition of her
status would be minimised. These changes would also beneﬁt male same sex couples
in surrogacy by giving them the legal right to apply for an early parental order to
enable them to make the day-to-day decisions affecting the child at a much earlier
stage. In addition, an early parental order would also assist hospitals with the question
of who has the right of access to the baby following birth.
The reversal of the presumption of motherhood operates successfully in other
countries. In the Ukraine where surrogacy is legal,95 the motherhood rights of the
commissioning mother are recognised from the moment of conception in the case of
gestational surrogacy (although not traditional surrogacy) and the names of the com-
missioning couple will appear on the child’s birth certiﬁcate as the parents and no
court order is necessary for a declaration of parentage and the consent of the surro-
gate mother is not required.96 However, to draw the presumption of motherhood in
favour of the commissioning mother at the point of conception without intervention
of the courts presents difﬁculties in terms of autonomy for the surrogate mother over
her own body when issues of an abortion for medical reasons arise. However, as dis-
cussed in section V, these difﬁculties can be overcome by careful consideration of the
stage of the pregnancy that an early parental order can be made.
Outside Europe, States such as California also favour a law based on the presump-
tion of parentage lying with the commissioning couple. The case of Johnson v Calvert
[1993]97 laid down important guidelines in respect of surrogacy and particularly
limits on the surrogate mother reneging on the arrangement. In this case, the Califor-
nian Supreme Court considered an appeal by the surrogate mother from a decision in
the Court of Appeal that the commissioning mother who had provided her ovum was
the legal mother. The Supreme Court held that the law recognised both the genetic
mother and the mother giving birth and that when the two coincide the legal mother
would be the genetic mother who intends to raise the child. The Supreme Court
therefore found in favour of the commissioning mother and commissioning father.
94 See cases such as Re C (a minor) Ward Surrogacy [1985] Fam Law 191 (the baby cotton case), Re Baby M
537 A.2d 1227, 109 N.J. 396 (N.J. 02/03/1988) and Johnson v Calvert 5 Cal.4th 84,851 P.2d 776. Whilst
the court found in favour of the surrogate mother in the case of Re P (minors)(wardship: surrogacy) 1987 2
FLR 421, this was because the child had lived with the surrogate mother for some time.
95 See Family Code of Ukraine Clause 123 and Order of the Health Ministry of Ukraine (Surrogacy Article
7) dated 23 December 2008.
96 See Determination of Origin of the Child Born as a Result of Auxillary Reproductive Technologies Code
123 Part 2 included in the Family Code of Ukraine dated 22 December 2006 as amended on 09 September
2011.
97 Johnson v Calvert [1993] 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776.
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In California, any surrogacy agreement has to be made before a surrogate is
impregnated, usually through IVF. Couples must then get a ‘pre-birth judgment’.98
This allows the names of the intended parents to be placed on the birth certiﬁcate.
The law focuses on the intention of the parties rather than biology and therefore a
biological mother is given the same rights as a non-biological mother. In the case of
Buzzanca v Buzzanca [1998],99 the Californian Appeal Court went further on the
issue of parentage and biology by declaring that where a surrogate receives donated
eggs and donated sperm and the gametes are not those of the commissioning couple,
the commissioning couple will still be regarded as the legal parents (thereby recognis-
ing the ‘socio-natural’ parent).
V. MOVING FROM CERTAINTY TO UNCERTAINTY
There are of course many valid arguments to support retaining a legal principle that
the birth mother should be recognised as the legal mother and retaining the certainty
principle. One of those arguments is that it prevents exploitation of women being
used merely for reproductive purposes and avoids commodiﬁcation of the human
body. This is a valid argument but ignores the intention of the parties and the fact
that surrogacy like other forms of donation such as organ donation is sometimes seen
as an act of generosity. The fact that commercial surrogacy remains illegal in this
country is arguably a sufﬁcient preventative measure against exploitation. The Brazier
Report recommended an introduction of a new statutory provision deﬁning in broad
terms the ‘reasonable expenses’ that could be paid to a surrogate with the commis-
sioning couple being required to provide evidence of expenses paid. The government
did not take this recommendation forward and it has been left to the courts to retro-
spectively authorise payments at different levels for the welfare of the child.100 By
deﬁning what ‘reasonable expenses’ mean it would be possible for the courts to iden-
tify when a surrogacy arrangement might be regarded as a commercial arrangement
and therefore an illegal act requiring refusal of applications for a parental order. In
addition, section 2 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 prohibits surrogacy agen-
cies from proﬁting from a surrogacy arrangement. The court could act as a Sentinel
for commercial surrogacy to ensure that cases involving exploitation of the surrogate
do not lead to recognition of legal parentage in the commissioning couple’s favour.
Israel has a system whereby gestational surrogacy is legal but only with the approval of
a seven member special committee comprising clinicians, lawyers, clergymen, and
social workers who then control expenses and insurance payments to the surrogate
for her pregnancy expenses.101 Although it is not suggested that the UK should adopt
the same system, there remains a need for the courts to police surrogacy arrangements
while commercial surrogacy remains illegal in the UK.
98 See Uniform Parentage Act 2013 7962(3)(f)(2).
99 Buzzanca v Buzzanca 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal.Ct.App.1998).
100 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54 (8) as implemented in cases such as X and Y
(Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 ; Re S (Parental Order) [2009] EWHC 2977 ; Re L (Commercial
Surrogacy Agreement Parental Order) [2011] EWHC 921; Re X and Y (Parental Order: Retrospective Authori-
sation of Payments) [2011] EWHC 3147 ; D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631; J v G [2013] All ER
(D) 36; Re P-M (Parental Order: Payments to Surrogacy Agency) [2013] EWHC 23280.
101 See A Benshushan and JG Schenker, ‘Legitimizing Surrogacy in Israel’ [1997] 12(8) Hum Rep 1832.
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Another argument against removing the mater semper certa est principle is that it
would not be in the best interests of the child to have multiple parents and therefore
multiple mothers. A child could potentially have six parents if all forms of parentage
were recognised: the surrogate mother, her husband, a sperm donor (who is not the
commissioning father), an egg donor (who is not the commissioning mother), the
commissioning mother, and the commissioning father. This is a compelling argu-
ment, but it is not sought to argue in this article that the child rearing should be
shared. The issue is whether the commissioning mother should be allowed to assert
her rights of motherhood very early in the surrogacy arrangement rather than waiting
until after the birth of the child.
By allowing the commissioning mother to assert her rights over the unborn child,
this does raise issues of autonomy in relation to the surrogate’s body and her right to
choose to abort the foetus regardless of the intentions of the parties to the surrogacy
arrangement. The surrogate mother’s right to abortion could become problematic if
the court has already recognised the commissioning mother’s motherhood status via
an early parental order. Under the Abortion Act 1967,102 the legal termination period
of a pregnancy is up to 24 weeks. Currently, any disputes between the parties as to
whether or not the foetus could be aborted would have to be dealt with by the courts
ﬁrst establishing parentage as hospitals and clinics would act on the wishes of the sur-
rogate mother as long as the criteria under section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is met.
Surrogacy agreements are not enforceable and therefore it would be difﬁcult under
English law to overcome the personal autonomy of the surrogate mother. An early
parental order could therefore have undesirable consequences if granted on or before
the 24-week period. Therefore, the timing of early parental orders must be given
careful consideration.
Allowing court intervention at an early stage raises the possibility that the surrogate
mother may change her mind about handing over the child but may be powerless to
refuse if a court order has been made transferring her legal parentage status before the
birth of the child. It is important that as currently exists in law the surrogate mother
should be given a post-birth ‘cooling-off period’ to assess whether she wishes to
change her mind and keep the child.103 As surrogacy is not enforceable, the cooling-
off period is perhaps the strongest argument against bringing forward court interven-
tion. However, in the case of gestational surrogacy where the commissioning mother
provides her ovum one could argue that it is very unlikely that the court would award
the surrogate mother custody of the child if she were to change her mind after the
cooling-off period. This is because the commissioning mother also has a biological
connection to the child and therefore it is arguable there are less risks associated with
early court intervention in this situation. However, in the case of a commissioning
mother with no biological connection to the child, it is accepted that these risks are
greater. A solution might be for the court to make an interim order in all such cases at
the pre-birth stage, which would still enable a cooling-off period, with the surrogate
mother returning to court to oppose a ﬁnal order after the birth if she were to change
her mind. This cooling-off period could remain at the present six weeks from birth.
102 Abortion Act 1967 s 1 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 s 37.
103 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54 (7).
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An interim order would enable the commissioning mother to register the birth of
the child.
An argument against according a non-biological mother the same status and rights
as a birth mother might be that a non-biological mother could have a psychological
detachment to the child. Olga Van Den Akker conducted research into the views of
commissioning mothers as to whether a genetic link to the child was important.104
The pragmatic view of the women who had no genetic connection was that they
wanted to form a family in anyway permissible within their capabilities. This did not
signal a detachment from the child. She found that of those commissioning mothers
using donated ova only thirty-one per cent thought that a genetic link was important.
This was, however, only a small study and there is no doubt larger studies are needed
on this issue. However, the position of a commissioning mother in terms of attach-
ment to the child is no different to that of a mother who adopts a child.105
In the case of surrogacy, there is an assumption a child’s welfare will somehow
suffer by not knowing its birth mother hence the need to accord the birth mother a
higher status as parent. However, until 2004 in England and Wales, sperm donor
fathers were permitted to remain anonymous.106 The right of the child to know its
legal parents is undeniable but allowing the commissioning mother to be nominated
as the legal mother need not interfere with the donor-conceived child’s right to know
their origins. The Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics in their recent report107 came
strongly in support of leaving the decision to disclose information relating to the don-
ation of sperm, eggs, or embryos used in fertility treatment to the parents and donors
and that this should remain a private decision with no interference from the State. It
would be wrong, however, to leave donor conceived children with less rights than
adopted children in relation to knowing their origins and the Hague Conference on
Private International Law have indicated that any future Convention on international
surrogacy should include the child’s right to know their identity.108 This could be
addressed by incorporating a surrogacy section into the Adoption Contact Register.
Currently, the regulatory body the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA) maintain a Register of Information, which enables donor conceived children
to request non-identifying information about their donor and any siblings related to
them and those of 18 years of age can request identifying information about related
siblings. The register could be extended to include private surrogacy rather than just
surrogacy involving treatment in a licensed clinic. Blyth, Frith, Jones, and Speirs109
have suggested that birth certiﬁcates could play a role in providing donor-conceived
104 Olga Van Den Akker, ‘The Importance of a Genetic Link in Mothers Commissioning a Surrogate Baby in
the UK’ [2000] 18 (8) Hum Rep 1849.
105 As noted in Department of Health’s Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments
and Regulation (‘the Brazier Report’) (White Paper Cm 4068, 1998) 4.4.
106 The anonymity for sperm donors was removed by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (disclosure of
Donor Information) Regulations 2004, which came into effect on 14 June 2004.
107 Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing [2013] <http://
www.nufﬁeldbioethics.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Donor_conception_report_2013.pdf> accessed 30th July 2013.
108 See Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from Inter-
national Surrogacy Arrangements, March 2012.
109 E Blyth and others, ‘The Role of Birth Certiﬁcates in Relation to Access to Biographical and Genetic
History in Donor Conception’ [2009] 17(2) Int J Child Rts 207.
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children with identifying information needed to identify donors by linking the
HFEA’s Register of Information with the General Records Ofﬁce to create a Donor
Transparency Register.
If one were to apply Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of biomedical
ethics110 in an attempt to solve the ethical issue of who should be considered the
mother, then I would argue that the balance would tip in favour of the commissioning
mother. The principlism approach recognises that in health care, parties should be
treated in accordance with the four principles of (1) respect for autonomy, (2) non-
maleﬁcence, (3) beneﬁcence, and (4) justice. Respect for autonomy would involve
recognising that the parties to a surrogacy arrangement have the capacity to act and
do so intending to honour the arrangement and understanding the issues involved.
By recognising that the surrogate’s rights should be protected by not making the sur-
rogacy arrangement enforceable and allowing the surrogate mother to challenge deci-
sions of motherhood following the making of an interim parental order, this ensures
that no harm or injury is done to the surrogate. By enabling the commissioning
mother’s motherhood status to be recognised at the pre-birth stage offers beneﬁts to
her in terms of identity and self-worth. The ﬁnal aspect of fairness through justice is
achieved by ensuring that court intervention remains a necessary feature of any
changes to the presumption of motherhood.
VI . WELFARE OF THE CHILD
In applications for a Parental order, the court must apply the welfare of the child prin-
ciple under section 1 (2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.111 This requires
the court to give paramount consideration to the child’s welfare throughout his/her
life. In doing so, the court will order a Parental Order Reporter from Cafcass to con-
sider the suitability of the commissioning parents to be parents and care for the child.
The welfare principle under the 2002 Act is slightly different to that found in section
1 (1) of the Children Act 1989 which states that ‘the child’s welfare shall be the
court’s paramount consideration’ but makes no reference to considering this through-
out the child’s life. Both Acts have a welfare checklist, but the 1989 Act has been criti-
cised for focusing attention solely on the rights of the child without any consideration
for the rights of the adults involved in the child’s upbringing.112 This is corrected to
an extent by the 2002 Act where the welfare checklist under section 14 (4)(f)(iii)
requires the court to consider’ the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or
of any such person regarding the child’. Section 1 (8)(b) clariﬁes that the term ‘rela-
tive’ includes ‘the child’s mother and father’ (although again these terms are not
deﬁned). It is argued that section 1(8)(b) should be widely deﬁned to include the
wishes and feelings of the commissioning mother and father.
The child already exists when an adoption arrangement is entered into and so it is
right its welfare should take precedence, but in the case of surrogacy the child is not
born at the time of the surrogacy arrangement and it is arguable therefore that the
110 See T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (OUP, USA 2013).
111 As required under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental orders) Regulations 2010 s 2.
112 See J Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1989).
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child’s rights could be combined with that of the parent so that the future child–
parent relationship becomes the court’s primary concern when considering early
parental orders.
Section 13 (5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as amended
by section 14 (2)(b) of the 2008 Act allows clinicians to consider the welfare of the
child before it is born by considering whether treatment should be offered to its pro-
spective parents. Emily Jackson argues that section 13 (5) is meaningless because it
extends the welfare principle to decisions taken pre-birth by pre-judging the ﬁtness of
a person receiving assisted treatment to be a suitable parent.113 However, Parliament
considered that it was important to enact this section and rather than remove it in the
2008 Act the words ‘need for a father’ where replaced by ‘need for supportive
parents’. This provision is, I would argue, important because it recognises the need to
consider who will be ultimately raising the child thereby recognising the importance
of the ‘socio-natural parent’. In addition, it demonstrates that decisions can be made
about the welfare of the child before its birth and taking into account the ﬁtness of
the parent. Jackson argues that it is wrong to pre-judge the ability of the commission-
ing couple to be good parents before the child is born and that the welfare of the
child should not be used to make judgments about who should receive fertility treat-
ment. Natural parents may only be subject to scrutiny of their parenting abilities once
they have attempted to care for a child and been found wanting. Whether section 13
(5) moves us closer to a world of licensing parents as envisaged by Hugh Lafollette114
is beyond the parameters of this article. However, section 13 (5) is useful to provide
an example of where the welfare of the child principle is used before a child is born. If
an early parental order application were feasible and could take place before the child
was born section 13 (5), although criticised, provides a model for the court to con-
sider both the welfare of the child and the rights of the parents at an earlier stage.
The need for recognition and identity on the part of the commissioning mother
should be regarded as an important consideration by the courts in determining parent-
age. The child–parent relationship is entwined and together they make up the nuclear
family. Many States protect the concept of the family in their Civil Codes, Conventions,
or legislation. The rights and privacy of the family are considered important rights
worth protecting. For example, the family is placed under the protection of the State in
the German Constitution.115 In Ireland, the Constitution further states:
The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the family in its constitution and
authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the
welfare of the Nation and the State.116
Whereas in England, the family laws recognise that the family is private and recog-
nises Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950117 but that the
protection of the child is the role of the State.
113 E Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ [2002] 65 MLR 176.
114 Above n 62.
115 Art 6, I Grungesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
116 Art 41 (1)(2) of the Irish Constitution 1937.
117 See the operation of Art 8 as incorporated into s 1 and Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
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The United Nations’ Convention of the Rights of the Child118 states that the best
interests of the child119 should prevail in all actions concerning children.120 However,
it also goes on to state that in doing so account should be taken of ‘the rights and
duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for
him or her’. The case of HS (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2011]121 conﬁrmed that due consideration should be given by the courts in England
and Wales to this Convention. If that is the case, the rights of the commissioning
mother in terms of legal parentage is, I would argue, an important right and duty to
take into account.
The importance of the family as a unit means that the welfare principle in surro-
gacy cases arguably should stretch to taking into account the commissioning parent’s
care and nurture role which will extend throughout the child’s life and recognise that
the welfare of the child and the welfare of its mother on the issue of parentage are
combined. Brighouse and Swift122 argue that granting parental rights does not have to
mean denying the child’s interests or welfare. In their view, the interests of the parent
and child are intertwined and while parents might have their own interests to serve,
parenting instinctively involves putting the child’s interests ﬁrst.
VII . THE CALIFORNIAN MODEL
At 8.12 of the Brazier Report,123 the Committee recommended that parties to a surro-
gacy agreement should be encouraged to enter into a Memorandum of Understand-
ing124 dealing with issues such as pregnancy arrangements, the future welfare of the
child, contact, and what the child should be told about its origins. The committee did
not explicitly suggest that the Memorandum of Understanding should be used to indi-
cate legal parentage, but I argue in this section that this Memorandum of Understand-
ing could provide a solution to the early recognition of the commissioning mother’s
status. By arguing that the legal deﬁnition of motherhood should move from a posi-
tion of certainty to a position of uncertainty, I am suggesting that in the case of surro-
gacy the deﬁnition should be widened to include not only the birth mother but also
the woman who is intended to be the mother as evidenced in writing between the
parties to the surrogacy arrangement. Where a Memorandum of Understanding exists
between the parties, then at the point of an application for an early parental order the
presumption of motherhood should be drawn in favour of the commissioning
mother. The Brazier committee stressed that the Memorandum of Understanding
should be non-contractual. As surrogacy contracts are currently unenforceable in the
118 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989.
119 The words ‘paramount consideration’ were originally used in the working text (1980 E/CN.4/1349) but
were not adopted—see judgment of Lady Clark of Carlton in HS (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department (2009) CSOH 124 para 19.
120 Above n 118 Art 3.
121 HS (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2009) CSOH 124 and [2010] CSIH 97.
122 Above n 66.
123 Above n 39.
124 Above n 39, 8.12–8.14.
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UK,125 the Memorandum of Understanding would serve as evidence of the intention
of the parties rather than as a contract.
California offers a model for the recognition of the motherhood of the commis-
sioning mother at an early stage. California has swept away discrimination in surro-
gacy and legal parentage by amending the California Family Code, which came into
effect on 1 January 2013.126 Under Californian law 7650 of the Family Code provides
that:
Any interested person may bring an action to determine the existence or non-
existence of a mother–child relationship.
The surrogate and the commissioning couple may enter into a written surrogacy
agreement known as ‘assisted reproduction agreements’. This enables the commis-
sioning couple to obtain a pre-birth judgment.127 This is usually from the fourth
to the seventh month of the surrogate’s pregnancy. However, for reasons outlined
earlier, because of the legal period for termination of pregnancies in England
and Wales, any pre-birth parental order would have to be after the six month of
pregnancy.
Section 7960 of the Code deﬁnes an intended parent as:
An individual, married or unmarried who manifests the intent to be legally
bound as the parent of the child resulting from assisted reproduction.128
This deﬁnition therefore includes both the biological and non-biological parent.
Under the Californian Family Code, surrogacy agreements must be notarised129
and will be valid if they meet a set criteria. The assisted reproduction agreement is
valid and cannot be revoked without an order of the court.130 Separate lawyers must
represent both sides to a surrogacy arrangement. The court is then able to establish
the intended parents as the legal parents but the court still requires ‘sufﬁcient proof
entitling the parties to the relief sought’131 and so to that extent the notarised agree-
ments are not automatically enforceable.
The UK model need not involve notarised ‘assisted reproduction agreements’
which could, as I have indicated, be replaced with a Memorandum of Understanding.
The requirement that such agreements should be drawn up by counsellors in the
same way that a Memorandum of Understanding is drawn up by divorcing couples in
mediation would offer an opportunity for all parties to a surrogacy arrangement to be
offered counselling.132 The courts could then consider such a Memorandum of
125 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 s 1A.
126 See California Family Code [2013] s 7960.
127 See Californian Family Code [2013] 7962 (3)(f)(2).
128 Above n 126.
129 Ibid.
130 Californian Family Code [2013] 7962(3)(f)(2)(i).
131 Above n 127.
132 At present counselling is only required under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act for couples
undergoing treatment in a licensed clinic.
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Understanding as part of an application for an early parental order. The proposed
Memorandum of Understanding would not be an enforceable document and would
still require approval of the courts and the court could and should seek the consent of
all parties to the making of an early parental order. This would simply require an
amendment to current UK legislation on parental orders to allow an application to be
made before the birth of the child. This would then enable the commissioning couple
to register the birth of the child directly without the need for re-registration. This
would also offer an opportunity for Parliament to consider whether the criteria relat-
ing to those who can apply for a parental order should change or remain the same.
Given my arguments that a social parent should be accorded the same rights as a
biological parent, a commissioning mother with no biological connection to the child
should also be entitled to apply for an early parental order. The welfare of the child
will still be safeguarded in that the court must still ensure that the surrogate has given
her voluntary informed consent and that it would be appropriate for the child to be
raised by the commissioning couple. A cooling off period could be built into the
process through an interim order being granted before the ﬁnal order. The role of the
court remains important. Theresa Glennon argues that the US approach to assisted
reproduction has developed what she has termed a ‘market-based individual approach’
to deﬁning autonomy where all involved individuals including clinicians and lawyers
would be responsible for deﬁning approaches to reproduction including the protec-
tion of the child’s interests.133 She compares this to the UK ‘communitarian approach’
to deﬁning autonomy, which relies on society to collectively develop a deﬁnition and
regulation of autonomy within a deﬁned structure. Certainly, California relies on a
system that gives autonomy to the parties to a surrogate arrangement to reach agree-
ment and record that agreement. In the UK, the court oversees any agreement. The
introduction of a Memorandum of Understanding would not move the UK out of its
present communitarian approach to autonomy as the courts would still be the guard-
ians and ﬁnal arbiters of whether the surrogacy arrangement as agreed should prevail.
There are of course issues relating to potential exploitation of surrogates especially
in an inter-country surrogacy arrangement. There are also issues about psychological
risks to the surrogate as well as the child on being separated and these issues need to
be given careful consideration in drafting any legislation. The court can continue to
treat inter-country surrogacy with particular care and scrutiny and Mr Justice Hedley
recognised in the case of Re IJ (A Child) [2011]134 that inter-country surrogacy appli-
cations remain complex and should continue to be heard in the High Court rather
than the lower courts.
VIII . CONCLUSION
In surrogacy, it is arguable that the best way to ameliorate the position of the commis-
sioning mother and provide an equitable situation for both the birth mother and the
non-birth mother is to change the legal deﬁnition of motherhood. There needs to be
133 T Glennon ‘UK and US Perspectives on the Regulation of Gamete Donation’ in M Richards, G Pennings
and JB Appleby (eds) Reproductive Donation: Practice, Policy and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2012) 94.
134 Re IJ (A Child) [2011] EWHC 921.
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a shift away from status based on giving birth (maternity) to status based on care
giving (motherhood). M.R and Anor135 illustrates how a mother’s inﬂuence on a
child is not based purely on genetics. The emerging science of epigenetics provides a
sound basis for widening the current deﬁnition of mother in the ﬁeld of surrogacy.
There is no doubt that the scattered legislation on surrogacy needs to be consolidated
into a central Surrogacy Act that rethinks the current position on commercial surro-
gacy and legal parentage. However, minor adjustments can be made to the present
legal framework to achieve a utilitarian approach to this complex area of law.
A change to the current presumption of motherhood could be achieved by early
recognition of the commissioning mother’s motherhood status before the birth of the
child similar to the model adopted in California or by changing the legal deﬁnition of
motherhood in surrogacy speciﬁc legislation. This would achieve fairness in according
surrogacy similar treatment in law to same sex female couples receiving other fertility
treatment in a licensed clinic. Both Honneth’s theory of ‘recognition as a unique
person’136 and Brighouse and Swift’s ‘uniqueness of parenthood’137 provide strong
arguments for a legal deﬁnition that accords with an individual’s sense of worth rather
than one based on biology.
In this article, I have suggested that the surrogate mother’s rights need not
be eroded by recognition of the motherhood rights of the commissioning couple
pre-birth.
To continue to provide a generous legal deﬁnition of fatherhood and parenthood
while maintaining a restricted deﬁnition of motherhood causes unfairness in the area
of surrogacy given that the parties have already indicated their intentions with regard
to the issue of the ultimate parent. This utilitarian rather than deontological approach
to motherhood (within the conﬁnes of surrogacy) would ensure the welfare of both
mother and child and also preserve the future child–mother relationship while still
providing an opportunity for a surrogate mother to challenge legal status through the
courts. Primary legislation amending the deﬁnition of mother for surrogacy cases or
legislation that permits early parental order applications to be made would go some
way to correcting the mismatch between the law on legal parentage, social reality, and
scientiﬁc advancement. The use of Memorandum’s of Understanding to record the
intention of the parties on the question of parentage will also assist the courts in
making pre-birth parental orders.
While the Roman law principle of ‘mater semper certa est’ would be displaced
within surrogacy by adopting either of these models, it is clear that advances in medi-
cine have already displaced the principle yet the law has not caught up with the chang-
ing nature of motherhood while acknowledging the need to keep the deﬁnition of
fatherhood and parenthood up to date.
135 Above n 50.
136 Above n 66.
137 Above n 82.
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